

Operational Plan 2011-2015

DFID Sudan

March 2012

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1) Introduction

The UK Government is determined to help reduce the inequalities of opportunity we see around the world today. We believe that promoting global prosperity is both a moral duty and in the UK's national interest. Aid is only ever a means to an end, never an end in itself. It is wealth creation and sustainable growth that will help people to lift themselves out of poverty.

In May 2010, the International Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, commissioned the Bilateral Aid Review to take a comprehensive and ambitious look at the countries in which DFID works through our direct country and regional programmes. The review focussed on the best ways for the UK to tackle extreme poverty, ensuring that we make the greatest impact with every pound we spend. In parallel, through the Multilateral Aid Review, DFID assessed how effective the international organisations we fund are at tackling poverty.

On the 1st March 2011, the key outcomes of the reviews were announced, including the results that UK aid will deliver for the world's poorest people over the next four years. The Bilateral Aid Review has refocused the aid programme in fewer countries so that we can target our support where it will make the biggest difference and where the need is greatest. The Multilateral Aid Review findings enable us to put more money behind effective international organisations which are critical to delivering the UK's development priorities. In addition the independent Humanitarian Emergency Response Review looked at how the UK can build on its strengths in responding impartially to humanitarian needs and help ensure future disaster responses can be better prepared and coordinated.

DFID is committed to being a global leader on transparency. In the current financial climate, we have a particular duty to show that we are achieving value for every pound of UK taxpayers' money that we spend on development. Results, transparency and accountability are our watchwords and guide everything we do. DFID regards transparency as fundamental to improving its accountability to UK citizens and to improving accountability to citizens in the countries in which it works. Transparency will also help us achieve more value for money in the programmes we deliver and will improve the effectiveness of aid in reducing poverty.

The UK Aid Transparency Guarantee commits DFID to making our aid fully transparent to citizens in both the UK and developing countries. As part of this commitment we are publishing Operational Plans for country programmes. The Operational Plans set out the vision, priorities and results that will be delivered in each of our country programmes.

We will concentrate our efforts on supporting achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, creating wealth in poor countries, strengthening their governance and security and tackling climate change. The prize, in doing so, is huge: a better life for millions of people, and a safer, more prosperous world.

2) Context

Overview: Sudan is currently facing a period of transition with a significant degree of political, economic and military uncertainty, exacerbated by ongoing conflict in ten of its fifteen states. More than fifty years of independence have been characterised by deep social and political divisions, and dominated by conflict. On 9 July 2011, Sudan underwent a historic transition when South Sudan seceded. The new Sudan is a more homogeneous, although not uniform, Arab and Muslim state. Sudan is dominated politically and economically by Khartoum, with the ruling National Congress Party, strongly supported by the military, holding tightly to power. Long-term stability and prosperity for Sudan depend on achieving inclusive peace with justice in Darfur, agreement on the outstanding Comprehensive Peace Agreement issues, debt relief, and international rehabilitation through its removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list and the lifting of sanctions.

Conflict: Sudan has been dominated by a cycle of conflict over the last five decades which is both an outcome and the driver of severe humanitarian crises and chronic underdevelopment. The underlying causes and impact of short and long-term conflict mirror one another. Darfur remains insecure with more than 1.9 million people still displaced in 2011. Conflict has spread across Southern Kordofan, Abyei and Blue Nile; and insecurity and administrative impediments imposed by Government are shrinking the space for humanitarian and development action. Displacements are widespread and harvests interrupted by conflict.

Governance: The federal government undermines democratic and accountable governance through marginalisation of the peripheries, inequitable allocation of resources to states, weak institutional capacity, high levels of military expenditure and corruption, and a lack of accountability to its citizens.

Economy: Sudan has rich natural resources, including oil, and the potential to be a major agricultural producer. However it has a highly-centralised, heavily oil-dependent economy. Global increases in food and fuel prices, cuts in subsidies, and bans on numerous imports have led to rapidly increasing inflation. The loss of 75 per cent of its oil revenue post secession has led to a growing budget deficit and foreign currency shortages. Economic pressure is mounting, threatening political stability.

Poverty: Sudan suffers from protracted humanitarian emergencies and high, uneven levels of poverty. Government expenditure is heavily skewed towards the centre, with the periphery states characterised by poor performance on some or all of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The national poverty rate of 46.5 per cent masks large regional differences; this is particularly true in Darfur and the East. Sudan is off-track on the MDGs on gender equity in education, and under-five and maternal mortality rates. Rates of urbanisation are high, placing further pressure on the provision of basic services and much of the population is young and unskilled.

International Engagement: The UK is the second largest OECD bilateral donor in Sudan, after the USA. This may change as donors revise funding and engagement following South Sudan's secession. The main oil investors are China, Malaysia and India; some Gulf States also invest in real estate, infrastructure and services. Kuwait has been prominent, with a focus on the East. Trade with the UK has increased in recent years but remains relatively insignificant. Sudan is not a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement and as such is unable to access funding from the European Development Fund. Sudan also has international debts of around \$38bn. The Government, supported by donors at a technical level, is pressing hard to obtain debt relief, but political impediments remain in place.

UK Engagement: We work closely with other donors, particularly the traditionally like-minded, albeit in the face of falling aid flows to Sudan following South Sudan's secession. We follow best practice aid effectiveness principles for working in fragile states, and international humanitarian donor principles. Much of our programming has been funded so far through multi-donor trust funds and other pooled mechanisms. We work in close partnership with the EU and International Financial Institutions. We also collaborate closely with the other Troika members (USA and Norway) on a range of policy issues. We have signed a bilateral development agreement with USAID and are also looking to engage more with important non-traditional donors such as China, the Gulf States and Turkey.

3) Vision

Vision: *a Sudan which is at peace with itself and with its neighbours and where government has the capacity and political will to meet the needs and aspirations of all its people.*

This Plan starts during a **period of political transition**. **Levels of humanitarian and development need remain high**. The challenge now is to reduce the levels of violence and conflict; build economic stability; and allocate resources more equitably. This means moving funding away from privileged groups at the centre towards the marginalised peripheral states, reducing military expenditure, and increasing funding to social and productive sectors. This vision will best be met by a **managed process of change**. Over the next four years, DFID will focus on interventions that will address the **underlying causes and the impact of conflict** and **bring stability** to the country. We will target our **influence and funding** towards **helping those most in need**: the displaced, women and girls, the urban poor, and the disadvantaged young. We will encourage Sudan to move towards a more open and private sector-led economy. Tackling corruption at all levels will also remain a priority.

DFID will contribute to the **achievement of the UK Government's objectives** over the next four years: supporting the peaceful completion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA); working towards an inclusive peace with justice in Darfur; supporting national and regional stability; promoting human rights; and encouraging the development of democratic and accountable government. The Operational Plan aligns closely with the UK Government's Building Stability Overseas Strategy and the Country Business Plan for Sudan, and DFID's Structural Reform Plan and Business Plan. It also draws closely on the outcomes of the Multilateral Aid Review and the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review to shape its programming and delivery.

DFID will focus on helping Sudan develop in **four principal ways**:

1. A gradual **transition from humanitarian programmes to longer-term development** support for sustainable livelihoods, particularly in conflict-affected areas. We will though continue life-saving humanitarian support to those displaced through violence and conflict;
2. **Peace-building** between Sudan and South Sudan; in the East; in Darfur; and between Sudan and its neighbours, including through support to reduce the underlying causes of conflict and the community-level impact by improving access to services, and enabling currently excluded groups to influence decision-making;
3. Increased **security, peace and justice; democratic and accountable governance**; and a **reduction in of corruption**;
4. More **equitable and sustainable development** through a better use of the national budget; the extension of basic services; and a focus on economic diversification, increased livelihood opportunities, and employment.

Sudan remains an **expensive and high-risk environment** for development programming, but the potential return on investments is very high. It does not and will not, for the foreseeable future, channel any money through the Government of Sudan, but will continue to put funds through **non-governmental organisations, private sector firms, and multilateral agencies** which have robust financial management systems. DFID will also work with **state-level institutions**, aligning UK funding with their priorities, and building their capacity and systems to manage and administer the delivery of services to their own citizens. We will encourage and enable **civil society** to work alongside service providers to ensure their participation in decision-making. We will continue to work closely with **other donors**, including through joint programming and shared advisory/technical resources. We will help build a stronger evidence base of levels of need in order to target our funding to those that need it most and find innovative ways to monitor and evaluate projects in areas which we cannot easily access.

DFID is focused on achieving **optimum value for money** through robust programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. We will continue to manage programmes very tightly and will close projects or reallocate funding for those which are performing poorly. We will stop funding partners who do not manage for results or provide good value for money.

4) Results

Headline results

Pillar/ Strategic Priority	Indicator	Baseline	Expected Results
Water and Sanitation	Number of people with access to clean drinking water sources with DFID support	0 (2011)	800,000 (2015)
Education	Number of youth supported by DFID to obtain education and training to improve employment potential	0 (2011)	20,000 (2015)
Wealth Creation	Number of people and/or firms with access to financial services as a result of DFID support	0 (2012)	80,000 (2015)
Wealth Creation	Number of square kilometres of land returned to productive use through DFID support	TBC (2011)	10,000 km ² (2014)
Governance and Security	Number of women with improved access to justice services through DFID support	0 (2011)	250 000 (2014)
Governance and Security	Number of people who have choice and control over their own development supported by DFID	0 (2011)	800,000 (2015)
Humanitarian*	Number of people reached by health and nutrition-related programmes through DFID support in Sudan	0 (2011)	3 million (2012)
Humanitarian*	Number of people provided with food security and livelihoods assistance through DFID support in Sudan	0 (2011)	1.5 million (2012)

* The results from these programmes, which are annual, will fluctuate year on year in response to need.

4) Results (continued)

Evidence supporting results

DFID Sudan's programmes are based on strong evidence that building peaceful societies requires work to i) address conflict and fragility, ii) build inclusive political settlements and iii) develop core state functions that meets people's expectations. However the evidence base in Sudan itself is very poor. Data availability and quality is extremely low in some areas of our work across Sudan. We intend to address this during the design of new programmes, but further changes to the results offered and the framework may be required as more evidence becomes available.

Our work on governance and security is based on strong evidence that a more inclusive and equitable political settlement, as well as access to justice, aids state-building and reduces conflict. Data collection in Sudan has been hindered by the ongoing conflict and closed nature of the security services. Whilst the UN does collect a broad range of evidence on a regular basis, this is not project specific, is difficult to verify, and has poor attribution to UK work. The situation has begun to improve in recent years, and we will rely heavily on defence and security diplomacy and analysis to strengthen our baselines and impact monitoring.

New water and sanitation, demining and education projects are in the early stages of design. Results will be based on data from other projects. The UN has reliable data for all areas surveyed for land mines, although other areas remain to be surveyed. The World Bank has recently completed its Education Sector Status Report and this includes wide data sets from across all states.

DFID Sudan's humanitarian programmes are informed by strong data on need. The UN produces regular analysis, including annual food security assessments in South Sudan and Darfur, as well as a range of reports on the humanitarian situation. Main weaknesses include: sporadic and non-comparable nutrition surveys lacking sex disaggregation; and incomplete coverage due to poor access caused by insecurity, particularly in Darfur. The Common Humanitarian Fund's (CHF) results reporting is improving, but monitoring and evaluation needs to be strengthened. Work is ongoing on this.

Value for Money (VfM) rationale

The primary VfM rationale for investing in Sudan is around the risks and costs associated with renewed conflict. The war between North and South lasted 20 years and cost two million lives. Frontier Economics estimates that a return to war would cost US\$50bn to Sudan in lost GDP, US\$25bn to neighbouring countries, and US\$30bn in peacekeeping and humanitarian costs to the international community. We believe that alongside the rest of HMG's activities in Sudan, success in the programme areas outlined on slide 2, will also deliver substantial savings to the UK government, representing good VfM.

Many parts of Sudan are starting from an extremely low base in terms of development indicators. In this context, even small interventions can make a big difference. For example, in the eastern states of Kassala and Gederaf, the proportion of the population with access to safe drinking water is around 38 per cent, compared with an average of 58 per cent for sub-Saharan Africa

Finally, Sudan is amongst DFID's largest and most expensive humanitarian assistance programmes in the world. Whilst we will continue to provide urgent and life-saving support where it is needed, DFID's Operational Plan also focuses on moving people from non-life-saving interventions supported by humanitarian funds onto more durable and sustainable livelihoods through its new programmes on Water and Sanitation, Education and Health.

5) Delivery and Resources

Business Operating Model

DFID Sudan, located in Khartoum, is currently split into three teams: Policy, Programme and Corporate. The Corporate Team provides support in liaison with the British Embassy in Khartoum, which provides many of the services required for this office including transport, technical works and estates management. DFID's development programme is divided into three workstreams: Governance and Peacebuilding; Humanitarian and Livelihoods; and Basic Services and Economic Growth. DFID Sudan completed its separation from DFID South Sudan in July 2011 and there are now two fully autonomous but cooperating offices in the two new countries. Close cooperation with DFID South Sudan continues on a number of programmes operating both sides of the border in support of continued peace between the two countries.

Staffing

DFID Sudan's current staffing complement includes Corporate and Programme Management teams, and advisers in Governance, Social Development, Humanitarian Assistance, Conflict, Infrastructure and Economics. DFID's focus on improving the design of programmes and portfolio quality over the next four years, indicates the need for more in-country technical capacity, some of which can be achieved through shared resources with other partners. However, in the immediate term, in order to deliver on the Operational Plan, we will require additional expertise in Results and Education. Stronger corporate systems and a greater focus on developing skills and careers will also be essential.

Programme Delivery

DFID Sudan's current programme delivery is primarily through large multi-donor pooled funds managed by multilateral agencies and we will continue to use effective mechanisms such as the Common Humanitarian Fund managed by OCHA and UNDP. However, the Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) has found a wide variation in the relevance and effectiveness of multilaterals operating internationally and in Sudan. We will consider directly the MAR findings in appraising new business cases and mitigate risk by linking funding more closely to performance. Where mechanisms are performing poorly we will reallocate funding to other delivery partners including the private sector and NGOs.

The government in Sudan does not currently meet the UK's three partnership commitments (commitment to poverty reduction, human rights and international obligations, and strengthening financial management and accountability) for using government systems for budget support. Whilst no funds will therefore be routed through the government in Sudan, we will continue to align our assistance closely behind government priorities and consider greater use of counterpart funding where appropriate. Evidence from the DFID State-building /Peace-building framework and the OECD-DAC principles on international engagement in fragile states suggests that such approaches are essential in enhancing state capacity and avoiding long term aid-dependency.

Non-delivery partners will be crucial in achieving the Operational Plan. Since many of the challenges will be political and conflict-related, we will work closely with our colleagues in the Sudan Unit, the FCO, the Ministry of Defence, Stabilisation Unit, and British Council, as well as our Missions and Delegations to the UN, the European Union, the World Bank, IMF and African Development Bank.

5) Delivery and Resources (continued)

Programme Spend

Pillar/Strategic priority	2011/12		2012/13		2013/14		2014/15		TOTAL	
	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000
Wealth Creation			1,400		2,400		2,400		6,200	
Climate Change										
Governance and Security	9,995	0	12,000	0	16,100	0	16,100	0	54,195	0
Education		0	2,000	0	2,000	0	2,000	0	6,000	0
Reproductive, Maternal and Newborn Health		0		0					0	0
Malaria										
HIV/Aids										
Other Health			1,000		2,000		2,000		5,000	
Water and Sanitation	2,517		5,336		3,000	4,500	3,000	4,500	13,853	9,000
Poverty, Hunger and Vulnerability			1,000		2,000		2,000		5,000	
Humanitarian	13,309	0	43,000	0	12,000	0	9,000	0	77,309	0
Other MDG's	5,665		5,600	0	0	0	0	0	5,600	
Global Partnerships										
TOTAL	31,486	0	71,336	0	39,500	4,500	36,500	4,500	173,157	9,000

2010/11 Baseline: Sudan and South Sudan shared a combined budget of £140 million.

5) Delivery and Resources (continued)

	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	Total
	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
Frontline staff costs - Pay	800	1,259	1,309	1,309	1,309	5,986
Frontline staff costs - Non Pay	1,596	1,398	1,297	1,297	1,297	6,885
Administrative Costs - Pay	140	147	147	147	100	681
Administrative Costs - Non Pay	1,060	816	669	669	649	3,863
Total	3,596	3,620	3,422	3,422	3,355	17,415

We will meet our target reduction of 33 per cent administration costs in Khartoum by consolidating our housing units and dropping one post in FY13/14. There may also be savings to be gained from the potential co-location with the Embassy at the end of DFID's current office lease in 2013.

5) Delivery and Resources (continued)

Efficiency savings

Delivering Programme Efficiencies

Category	Details	Residual cost in the SR period £'000
Strategic Reprioritisation	See note below	
Further examples of Programme efficiency		

DFID Sudan has already streamlined its programme portfolio – decreasing the overall number of projects (covering will now be Sudan and South Sudan) from 60 to 35 at the end of 2010. We have done this through taking hard decisions not to allow extensions on programmes that were small or not performing strongly, and/or to reallocate resources from some poorly performing projects. In the case of our bilateral humanitarian portfolio, we took the opportunity presented by the expulsion of International Non-Governmental Organisations from Darfur in 2009, to rationalise our support through a smaller number of partners able to deliver more results. Whilst DFID does not believe any further reduction in the number of programmes would increase efficiency, we will ensure that these savings are retained by continuing to focus on fewer, larger and more effective programmes.

Savings Initiative	2011/12		2012/13		2013/14		2014/15	
	PAY	Non Pay £'000	PAY	Non Pay £'000	PAY £'000	Non Pay £'000	PAY	Non Pay £'000
Reduction in Consultancy				5		5		5
Reduction in Admin staff					70	30		
Reduction in Travel				5		5		5
Reduction in Training						5		
Accommodation				74				
Total	0	0	0	84	70	45	0	10

6) Delivering Value for Money (VfM)

DFID Sudan has attached high importance over the last year to demonstrating VfM in our current and future programming, and in all our procurement. Additionally, we have prioritised the enhancement of our unit's procurement capacity through training, and placed renewed emphasis on the VfM agenda in our management of pooled/multi-donor funds in Sudan. Given the challenging operating environment, financial forecasting is a particular challenge – with unexpected eventualities frequently holding back project delivery and expenditure. We mitigate this risk by putting in place robust contingency plans and closely scrutinising forecasts.

Particular challenges are presented by the context in Sudan, such as poor infrastructure and high security costs. For instance in the highly insecure operating environment of Darfur, security costs account for 20 per cent of programme costs. Also much of the Sudan programme will continue to be focussed on areas such as governance, state- and peace-building, and security where it is particularly difficult to demonstrate VfM. Finally Sudan's debt arrears to the main multilaterals reduces the choice of implementing partners through which DFID could work. However these factors should not bar us from embedding VfM in the DNA of the office. We will be working closely with central Departments to strengthen our understanding of how to address these challenges.

Within this context, DFID Sudan has worked hard to identify the most cost effective options available for achieving results.

Specific actions being taken to address economy, efficiency and effectiveness:

- Testing VfM of different delivery models. DFID Sudan will look to use a range of delivery models, including delegating management to donors with comparative advantages in different areas. We are in discussions to consider using other models such as consortia of NGOs to deliver basic services. We are comparing VfM performance to see which works best.
- Pressing UN and other partners on management fees, particularly in cases where agencies act as managers of funds and then sub-contract to other partners. We will minimise the money spent on management to increase the share spent on delivering results.
- Looking to learn from the reviews of the Common Humanitarian Fund in the DRC, Sudan and CAR and see how Sudan's fund could be made more cost-effective. This mechanism currently represents around 45 per cent of DFID Sudan's programme and by its very nature – humanitarian imperative, and annual, unsustainable, project allocations to NGOs and UN Agencies – it is sub-optimal on VfM/Cost-benefit ratios. We intend to reduce the footprint of our humanitarian spend over the four years, subject to conditions on the ground, as well as seek greater cost-effectiveness: both improvements will yield significant returns.
- Because of the high, front-loaded start-up costs in Sudan we will consider programmes of longer duration (e.g. more than four years), to maximise opportunities for transformational impact and to increase value for money by minimising start-up costs.

Stepping up VfM in 2012

- A stronger approach to improving VfM will be developed in the second quarter of the year. A number of issues around VfM such as future security costs and ways of working in Sudan will become clearer as the shape and politics of the post-CPA transition firms up.
- Plans include establishing a set of benchmarks for unit costs. These should take account of the costly environment but also measure performance and challenge partners to find ways to work more cost-effectively. We will also increase understanding of VfM among our implementing partners and ensure that they maximise it through their management of DFID-supported programmes.
- We will look more at cost-determination so that cost-effectiveness can be better addressed in our programmes. A clearer understanding of how costs are broken down will allow us to identify factors largely outside of our control, such as the cost of private delivery of utilities and additional security in Sudan, and areas where we can most improve and press partners to do so.
- We will harness Corporate and Divisional financial improvement strategies and tools to ensure we have the correct systems, procedures and practice in place to drive continued improvement in financial management. We will further strengthen financial forecasting by implementing a monthly quality assurance process including better partner engagement and sign-off by Senior Management Team.
- We will improve our portfolio performance by taking emergency measures or closing down poor performing projects and by establishing an enhanced portfolio review process.
- The office will produce a comprehensive anti-corruption and fraud strategy.

7) Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring

How: DFID Sudan will work closely with implementing partners to ensure that all new programmes contain a robust monitoring plan focussing on results and value for money. This will include metadata, and plans for data collection, reporting, programme evaluation and risk management. These will include partnerships with third parties, where necessary, to ensure independent data for optimum results management. Data for monitoring will come from a variety of sources, including national surveys, government information management systems, beneficiary perception surveys, and programme specific information systems. We will work to strengthen the evidence base of our programmes with a particular emphasis on gathering and monitoring data disaggregated by sex, age, and geographic location. We will allocate up to 5 per cent of programme funding for monitoring. Where appropriate we will design Performance Improvement Action Plans for poorly performing programmes to ensure closer monitoring. We will set out what minimum results a programme must achieve to continue receiving DFID support, and consider redesigning or terminating programmes that fall short. We will produce Monitoring Guidance for use in the conflict-affected areas by March 2012.

Who: Implementing partners will be responsible for day-to-day programme monitoring. Alert to the risks of self-reporting, DFID lead advisers and programme managers will provide oversight and quality assurance, developing concepts, feeding into design work, and commenting on and contributing to Annual Reviews and Project Completion Reviews. The Khartoum-based Results Adviser, to be recruited by July 2012, will be responsible for advising on and providing quality control of results at all stages of design, implementation and review.

When: DFID-Sudan will maintain continuous dialogue with implementing partners about programme performance, and we will formally agree with partners a results reporting schedule and format, at least six monthly, to include results, narrative, and financial reporting. We will aim to carry out up to two field visits per programme per year, bearing in mind the need for proportionality. Programme performance and results will be reviewed annually and at completion. DFID Sudan will review its results framework every six months, and refresh this Operational Plan annually.

Evaluation

DFID Sudan is committed to improving evidence and accountability through evaluation. We will produce an Evaluation Strategy with support from Evaluation Department by April 2012. For each new programme we will consider whether an independent evaluation is desirable depending on the size, strategic importance, degree of novelty, and the strength of current evidence. For existing programmes, we will consider whether an evaluation is appropriate. Where there is a low evidence base we will improve this through data collection as part of monitoring and through evaluations. We will consider evaluation of cross-cutting themes, for example conflict sensitivity or gender across a number of our programmes. We will earmark 3-5 per cent of programme funds for evaluation depending on whether primary data collection is needed. The outcome of evaluations will be shared with partners and stakeholders and published, unless deemed to pose a credible security risk or a reputational risk to HMG. All advisers and some programme staff will gain evaluation skills Level 2 accreditation in the next 12 months. We will ensure that lessons learned from evaluations are used as part of the DFID Sudan Communications Strategy.

Building capacity of partners

Our priority is to support national partners and help build their capacity. Where possible we will work with government, particularly at state level, to improve national systems and the quality, relevance and timeliness of the data. We will also work with and support our international partners (including managers of pooled funds to which we contribute) to ensure that they have adequate monitoring and evaluation functions to allow effective self monitoring and evaluation.

8) Transparency

DFID Sudan will meet its commitments under the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee.

Transparency is one of the top priorities for the UK Government. DFID Sudan will ensure that we continue to meet our commitments under the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee. We will publish detailed information about DFID projects, including programme documents and all spend above £500. We will continue to ensure that information is accessible, comparable, accurate, timely and in a common standard with other donors and that we provide opportunities for those directly affected by our projects to provide feedback.

We will publish detailed information of all new programmes on the DFID website, and all procurement over the £25,000 threshold. Annual project performance reporting and end of project evaluation from April 2011 will also be published. We will ensure that wherever possible all information in the public domain is comprehensive, accessible, comparable, accurate and timely.

DFID Sudan will work hard to promote accessibility to information in Sudan. This will include continuing to contribute to the Embassy-led 'UK in Sudan' website and issuing local press releases on our work through the Embassy communications team. We will also begin to produce an information sheet detailing our work in Sudan, highlighting our impact and results. The UK aid logo will be used appropriately on buildings, commodities and other materials for DFID-funded programmes so it is clear what UK aid is supporting.

DFID Sudan does not presently provide information directly in the main local language - Arabic. With the Embassy, we will explore the option of more proactively working with radio broadcasters working in local languages across Sudan to publicise our support and also to increase the demand side for accountability of public resources in across Sudan. We will ensure that from January 2011 all local publications we produce, including project summaries for newly approved programmes are published in Arabic. Many of our implementing partners do already provide project information in local languages. For example, leaflets explaining the work they are doing.

We will meet the standards set out in the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), and encourage our partners in civil society, multilateral organisations and other donors to do the same. Through our relationships with the Government we will encourage greater transparency to their citizens about their budgets and the aid which they receive.

We will increase opportunities for feedback by those benefiting from DFID programmes. DFID Sudan is currently designing a number of large new programmes, including in water and sanitation and developing the private sector. We will explore what will be the most effective ways for the voices of the beneficiaries to be heard during the design process as well as during the operation and appraisal of the programmes. We will look at easy, innovative and cost effective ways of gathering the views of beneficiaries, including through traditional means such as field visit and interviews as well as through technology such as mobile communications.

List of Annexes

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Gender Annex
Theory of Change

DFID SUDAN OPERATIONAL PLAN: GENDER ANNEX

The challenges for women and girls in Sudan

- 46.5% of the population of Sudan is found to fall below the poverty line (set at SDG 113.8 per person per month), with 26.5% of the urban population and 57.6% of the rural population falling below the poverty line.ⁱ However, poverty data in Sudan is not disaggregated by sex;
- Many indicators in Sudan, for example those covering basic services (health, water and education), mask significant urban-rural, regional, gender and socioeconomic disparities;
- Sudan ranks 128 of 146 countries in the 2011 Gender Equality Index for countries where there are data (although this combines data for both Sudan and South Sudan as disaggregated data are not available);ⁱⁱ
- Sudan is one of ten countries posing most risk to the rights of women;ⁱⁱⁱ
- Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C) is still practised widely. 89% of women aged 15-49 have undergone some form of FGM/C, although rates vary across regions and ethnic groups;^{iv}
- The contraceptive prevalence rate is extremely low – 9%. The total fertility rate is high, at 5.6 children per woman in Sudan;^v
- The literacy rate for women from the poorest households is as low as 20%. Only 45% of young women aged 15-24 are literate;^{vi}
- A combination of conflict, large-scale population displacement and underlying hunger and poverty make Sudan one of the world's largest humanitarian operations. In Darfur over 4.5m people are affected by the conflict and 1.9m people are currently living in IDP camps.^{vii} Many of these are women and children;
- Sudan has not signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and its Optional Protocol.^{viii}

Overview

1. Improving women's and girls' access to basic services, economic opportunities, and human rights in Sudan is a top priority for DFID Sudan. Although consolidated and sex disaggregated data are currently scarce, it is clear that women and girls suffer disproportionately from the impact of conflict and displacement, and exclusion from access to basic education and primary healthcare, whilst remaining responsible for a large share of the family workload.

2. The DFID Sudan Gender Plan links directly to three of the four objectives in DFID's Gender Strategy:

- Direct assets for girls and women
- Get girls through secondary school
- Prevent violence against girls and women

3. DFID Sudan, in collaboration with the FCO and MoD will also work to:

- Challenge discrimination against girls and women and build effective legal frameworks to protect girls' and women's human rights and sustain political commitment;
- Increase the value given to girls and women by society;

- Increase the power of girls and women to make informed choices and control decisions that affect them.
4. Sudan recognises the equality of men and women and requires the state to protect the rights of both. The Interim National Constitution (2005) contains numerous references to Sudan's commitment "to uphold values of justice, equality, human dignity and equal rights and duties of men and women."
 5. Despite these advances, the importance of the customs and traditions of the Sudanese people continue to create tensions within the Sudanese legal framework. The gap in application and enforcement between customary and formal law allows the abuse of women's human rights, permitting, for example, early marriage and limiting women's property rights. The GoS has not passed legislation at the federal level to expressly prohibit FGM/C. The range of employment opportunities for women and girls, men and boys is limited by these customary roles. Gender based discrimination also inhibits women's access to education and health services. Sexual and gender-based violence remains a serious concern in the conflict-affected areas, including Darfur, Southern Kordofan, Abyei and Blue Nile.
 6. The opportunities and mechanisms available to the poor to hold government accountable for the fair delivery of services and fulfilment of human rights are limited currently.

Our approach

7. DFID's work to achieve gender equality in Sudan is informed by the Analysis of Gender and Social Exclusion in Sudan (2008), the Sudan Household Surveys (2008 and 2010) and a range of UN and World Bank reports containing data disaggregated by sex. This work highlights the barriers and potential opportunities to ensure that all sections of society participate in and benefit directly from poverty reduction efforts. In 2009 DFID commissioned a study to help us improve our performance on achieving gender equality. We are acting on these recommendations.
8. DFID Sudan has ambitious targets. The Operational Plan commits DFID to help Sudan to develop in a way which particularly benefits girls and women; states an intention to integrate targets on gender across DFID programming; and includes specific commitments on education, economic empowerment and eliminating violence against women. As such, the Operational Plan for Sudan will deliver results against three of the four pillars in DFID's overall strategy on girls and women.
9. To realise these ambitions DFID Sudan will:
 - i. Invest in staff to ensure that DFID is able to promote and incorporate gender and social inclusion in all its work in Sudan;
 - ii. Improve understanding of the attitudes, behaviours, and barriers which constrain achievement of the full rights of women and girls in Sudan;
 - iii. Deliver programmes with a clear focus on women and girls;
 - iv. Measure the impact of DFID programmes with better evidence and analysis broken down by sex, age, income quintile, and location when this is possible;

v. Strengthen the participation of communities, including women and girls, in DFID programmes;

vi. Use the UK Government position as a major donor in Sudan to influence the work of others, including our partners in national and state government, the United Nations, and international NGOs, to leverage greater change.

DFID Sudan focus on results for women and girls

10. The following table sets out results for programmes where women and girls are the direct beneficiaries and for programmes that will have a particular benefit for women and girls.^{ix}

Sector	Sudan
EDUCATION	20,000 youth supported by DFID to obtain education and training to improve employment potential
GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY	250,000 women with improved access to justice services
HUMANITARIAN	Up to 750,000 million women and girls a year provided with food security and livelihoods support Up to 600,000 women and girls a year provided with non-food items and emergency shelter Up to 1.5 million women and girls a year provided with life-saving health and nutrition support
WEALTH CREATION	80,000 people with access to financial services as a result of DFID support
WATER AND SANITATION	800,000 people with access to clean drinking water as a result of DFID support

11. In addition, we will increase our focus on violence against women with a targeted programme to reduce prevalence of FGM/C in Sudan.

ⁱ Castro, M.C. (2010). Poverty in Northern Sudan, Estimates from the NBHS 2009 (draft)

ⁱⁱ <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/gii/>

ⁱⁱⁱ 2011 Maplecroft Women's and Girls' Right Index (see http://maplecroft.com/about/news/womens_girls_right_index.html and www.girlsdiscovered.org). According to the index, the 10 countries posing most risk to the rights of women are Iran, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, DR Congo, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Burundi, Haiti and Nigeria.

^{iv} www.childinfo.org/files/Sudan_FGC_profile_English.pdf

^v 2010 Sudan Household Health Survey 2nd Round, Summary Report, July 2011

^{vi} 2010 Sudan Household Health Survey 2nd Round, Summary Report, July 2011

^{vii} OCHA. Sudan: 2011 Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 21 October 2011).

^{viii} Human Rights Council. Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15(c) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, 25 February 2011, A/HRC/WG.6/11/SDN/3

^{ix} As our programmes on water and sanitation, wealth creation and education are developed further we will provide disaggregation of results by sex. The humanitarian results for women and girls represent 50% of the total result based on demographic data for Sudan.

ANNEX D: DFID SUDAN OPERATIONAL PLAN THEORY OF CHANGE

Theory of Change:

Conflict in Sudan over the last five decades has been cyclical - both an outcome and cause of underdevelopment. The drivers (political and economic marginalisation of the peripheries, competition for natural resources and weak governance) must be addressed at a government and community level if the cycle is to be broken and stability achieved. By increasing community resilience to conflict and addressing the underlying causes, our support can graduate from short-term life saving interventions to sustainable development.

