



# Project Synthesis Report

A REVIEW OF TRENDS, PROJECT SCORING AND LESSONS  
APRIL 2005 TO DECEMBER 2008

FINAL REPORT

*by*

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## **Box 2. Sierra Leone Budget Support 2004 to 2007**

Sierra Leone received three tranches of budget support funding during the period:

- £12 million in 2004/5 reviewed in February 2006
- £12.5 million in 2005/6 reviewed in May 2007
- £12.5 million in 2006/7 reviewed in May 2007

During the first year DFID's contribution stood alone but in subsequent years the European Community, World Bank and African Development Bank were significant partners.

The purpose scores in each of the three PCR were 2, likely to be largely achieved. The output score dropped from 2 in the first year to 3 (likely to be partly achieved) in subsequent years. The present review considered these scores justified and noted the following factors that contributed to the quality of the scoring:

- High level political interest in the progress of this activity, especially in the first year when the Secretary of State wrote to the President of Sierra Leone to stress the need for progress.
- Clear need to learn lessons for subsequent years of budget support to Sierra Leone in the context of a 10 year partnership agreement between the UK and GoSL, for which the MoU was signed in 2002
- The innovative use of a performance tranche may have provided a further incentive to track progress
- Provision of OVIs with differentiation of scoring between them and a clear justification for the overall scores
- The use of standard indicators (macro-economic and social) at the purpose level supported by the development of GoSL systems for planning and financial management providing data on progress
- Triangulation of different sources of information. External validation provided by IMF ( tracking progress against PRGF) and written evidence from GoSL on progress against other indicators
- The PCRs were undertaken by an external and independent consultant who reviewed documentation. In the second and third years the consultant also interviewed partners and stakeholders.

The present review also notes the following points in the Sierra Leone Budget Support PCR:

- The only outputs specified concern the achievement of the 10 year MoU targets. The final PCR raises questions how to assess the contribution of outputs from DFID partnership activities to achieving the purpose of budget support without a more precise logical framework.
- The contribution that DFID made to macro-economic stability in the first year appears justified in view of the withholding of funds by other donors because of the relatively high risks. The assessment of risk was revised to medium in subsequent years and other donors joined in the programme.
- The performance tranche, while a useful tool, had been less effective than expected. The final PCR indicates its effectiveness needs to be considered in relation to other donors' activities and government capacity.
- One expectation was that budget support might help to avert conflict after the cessation of the civil war. The PCR provides some justification in the first year though it is challenging to be definitive with so many other factors involved.



















































































**Table 17. Percentage of PCRs by broad sector over time**




2005/06 – 2008/09 data included in table 17 to replicate the table in the previous 2000/2005 PCR synthesis report.

**Table 18. Projects (%) by sector scoring 1 or 2 by period**



Only 2005/06 – 2006/07 data included in table 18 to replicate the table in the previous 2000/2005 PCR synthesis report.

**Table 19. Purpose Rating Scores by Departmental Strategic Objectives (DSO)**



Project scores: 1 Likely to be completely achieved. 2 Likely to be largely achieved. 3 Likely to be partly achieved. 4 Only likely to be achieved to a very limited extent. 5 Unlikely to be achieved. X Not scored.

## Annex 4 Comparison of findings in 2005 and 2008

### Synthesis Report 2000 – 2005

### Study 2005 – 2008

#### Overall impressions after analysis of 97 PCR

#### BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS

##### Conditionality, donor power to influence

4.1. In general, the PCR lessons are very supportive of the Paris/UNDP agenda. The authors have a lot to say about the crucial importance of local ownership and local leadership. This category of comment formed the largest group in our analysis. There are many comments that emphasise the point that the quality of partnership with other stakeholders (shared vision, transparent communications, shared decision-making etc) is key to successful donor interventions. Other strong themes are the importance of beneficiaries taking part at all stages of the project cycle and harmonisation with other donors.

*Confirmed.*

*Many comments on ownership, but more on joint working aspect.*

*Communication is an issue*

4.2. Looking in more detail at the lessons on partnership, PCRs display a range of views on the question of **conditionality** and using donor power to **influence** partners. Although these issues are addressed explicitly in a relatively small number of PCRs, they are of considerable topical interest. Starting with experience from programme aid, a Uganda PCR argues that conditionality is important because it strengthens the hand of pro-reform elements in the Government. A Ghana PCR comments that tranching programme aid (i.e. tying the release of funds to the achievement of specific conditions) focussed the dialogue with Government on the need for financial management reform. One from Kenya says that dividing the release into tranches with clear triggers was a sensible strategy to mitigate the risk of policy reform going off-track. On the other hand a Rwanda PCR argues that “tying disbursements to specific actions or events does not build ownership of policies nor does it allow good budgeting”.

*Budget support*

*Issues extensively addressed. The large majority of views were that performance tranches had a positive impact on the reform process.*

The author pressed for predictable funding; a view endorsed by a PCR from Mozambique. Another PCR from Mozambique declared that one should “avoid conditionality since non-compliance complicates relationships”.

4.3. The Uganda PCR recognises the need for donors to handle sensitive issues which could become deal-breakers. Political conditionality is also addressed specifically in one from Ethiopia. The message from Uganda is that the difficult issues should be explicit to all the stakeholders, there should be an agreed forum for dialogue and a graduated response when things go wrong, involving fixed and variable tranches of funds. The Ethiopian experience showed that when using political governance indicators for budget support it is important to get the right people in the international community (including the British Ambassador) to do the negotiating.

4.4. Some PCRs from India and Pakistan (both programme and project aid) suggested that donor coordination, particularly with the IFIs, should be part of a search for increased leverage. On the other hand, one from Vietnam recognised the need to be realistic about DFID’s influence in a country that is not dependent on aid. Moreover, the author produced the mainstream conclusion that “where partner governments have strong commitment to and good track records in growth and poverty reduction, budget support does not have to focus directly on the budget process... Instead it can focus on key reforms and pro-poor developments...”

4.5. Many PCRs stress that influence depends on building strong and credible relationships with partners. This is an important lesson from the health SWAps in Ghana and Bangladesh. The Ghana experience of a local DFID health office was particularly positive. See for example, DFID’s paper “Partnerships for Poverty Reduction: Rethinking Conditionality” of March 2005.

4.6. Of course, the question of the appropriate use of donor power is not just

*Issues extensively addressed in the same line.*

*Re realism: nothing mentioned*

*No similar statement*

*Confirmed*

*Constraint.*

relevant to programme aid but across the spectrum of aid activities. There are several references in the PCRs to the importance of equal partnerships with other stakeholders but little on how to achieve this. Perhaps, there is value in DFID seeing itself as others do. There are only two instances in our sample of comments from partners in PCRs. These are not overly complimentary: in one case an International NGO cited DFID's lack of transparency and weak communications and in another an NGO felt that DFID saw the project as a financial contract rather than a partnership. Several PCRs highlight the tension between financial accountability and releasing control. For example, DFID's financial aid procedures, in principle, facilitate the transfer of responsibility to the recipient Government. However, in two cases of failed IT programmes (Mozambique and Ghana) the Governments did not supervise the contracts adequately and, by implication, DFID was criticised for having ceded too much control.

*To be added: the imbalance between various donors financial and human resources is a constraints*

4.7. A Peru PCR dealing with a rights-based project was the only one to confront the issue of power imbalances head on: "Rights-based partnerships mean horizontal relationships: these are not easy if one partner has the money and veto power. More powerful stakeholders need to change attitudes and show will to shed some power and share control (which DFID tried to do with Oxfam in this case)."

*No similar statement*

### **Local ownership and leadership**

4.8. The PCRs give strong support to the emphasis on **local ownership and leadership** and there is a good deal of comment concerning what that means in practice. There have clearly been cases when DFID has found it hard to tell whether rhetorical commitment is genuine. The Kenya programme aid case, already cited, is a classic of donor wishful thinking: "Judgements were made about the political commitment of a government which had previously shown very mixed commitment to poverty reduction, improving public expenditure

*Confirmed*

*Such a case was not found*





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|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is vital to build strong personal relationships between project staff (i.e. DFID officials, project managers, TCOs, consultants) and their local partners. Suggestions include deploying an appropriate mix of local and foreign expertise, locating someone with real authority close to project partners, ensuring continuity of staff and encouraging personal behaviour that makes staff credible such as delivering timely responses to local needs, being sensitive to the local situation and maintaining partnership principles of openness and transparency.</li> </ul> | <p><i>No similar statement, except for staff continuity, being sensitive to the local situation and maintaining partnership principles of openness and transparency.</i></p> |
| <p><b>Working with specific partners</b></p>   |  |
| <p>4.14. 1/5 of the sample PCRs commented on relationships with other donors and international NGOs.</p>   | <p><i>1/3 of PCR commented on harmonization issues. Few concerned relationships with INGOs</i></p>   |
| <p>Support for better <b>joint working between donors</b>. e.g. Tanzanian PCR “working with other donors increases the transaction costs for donors but reduces them for GoT. Further efficiency gains could be made. However, this would require a strong commitment from donors to rationalise and agree to focus on core competences.”</p>  | <p><i>Confirmed</i></p> <p><i>Re transaction cost, opposite statement</i></p>  |
| <p>4.15. Crucial to have a shared vision<br/>Beneficial synergy between DFID and other funders<br/>Example of a lack of common understanding, which led to confusion. In some cases, the failure to reach a common understanding partly due to the lead partner (in these cases World Bank, IDB and UNDP) not taking a strong enough coordinating role.</p>  | <p><i>Confirmed</i></p> <p><i>Confirmed</i></p> <p><i>Confirmed</i></p>  |
| <p>Lessons learned:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The need to define clearly donor roles in advance.</li> <li>• The positive role of a common funding mechanism in encouraging a more common approach among donors;</li> <li>• The need for a formal joint agreement between funding partners or “common arrangements” – but an Indian PCR argues that when there is a shared vision</li> </ul>   | <p><i>Confirmed</i></p> <p><i>Confirmed</i></p> <p><i>Confirmed</i></p>  |

that is unnecessary;

- The need for donors to have an operational strategy to respond to slowing policy reform, which is explicit to the Government;
- The need for a contingency plan covering the withdrawal of co-financing.

*No similar statement*

*No similar statement*

4.16. **World Bank:** positive. Call on a wide range of expertise, rigour, joint approach reduced transactions cost for Government while increasing DFID’s clout. Negative side, staff based in Washington, communications difficult, too much time on unnecessary details. At times, difficult for DFID’s voice to be heard.

*No similar statement*

4.17. EC (only one comment): flexibility provided by parallel DFID funding, but administrative burden on project management.

*No similar statement*

#### **UN System**

*Confirmed in Humanitarian Assistance*

4.18. UN System; Heavy workload for DFID. Particular issue in three cases: weak management, lack of advisory capacity. In one comment: in future, when contemplating a UNDP-managed programme, DFID should review the capacity of UNDP’s management structures at the design stage. In two other cases, however, UNDP and UNFPA may have been slow but they did provide a reasonable standard of management.

*Confirmed*

4.19. Good experience of a partnership with WHO good examples of collaboration with UNOPS and UNICEF.

*Confirmed*

4.20. Humanitarian aid with UN system: experience was generally positive too. But, bureaucracy of the UN system. Around £77m in the sample have been channeled through WFP: good at delivery, good relationship with Governments. However, operating quite independently and there are queries about its partnership with government and

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|---|--|-------------------------|
| <p>the local non-government sector.</p>   | <p><b>4.21. Working with Governments:</b> overcome failures in coordination between Ministries and Departments.<br/>         Bridging the gap between central and local government is a particular challenge.<br/>         Lessons: engagement at both central and local government, testing the relationship between levels of government at the preparatory stage and involving a broad range of stakeholders.</p> | <p><i>Confirmed</i></p> |
| <p><b>4.22. Working with local communities:</b> major concern of many projects in the sample, from one Bangladesh project “necessary to define clearly the units for community partnerships ... should not be assumed that NGOs automatically represent community views.”</p>   | <p><i>Confirmed</i></p>  | <p><i>Confirmed</i></p> |
| <p><b>4.23.</b> Community involvement is vital (infrastructure in health, education and roads).<br/>         Key lessons:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Involve communities from the beginning and, in the early stages of developing a provider/community partnership, make sure that the community sets the goals based on guidance;</li> <li>• Support what people are doing already and make sure it is demand-driven;</li> <li>• Take time to build partnerships and make sure communities receive sustained support including from the government;</li> <li>• Identify local leaders and resource people to help make interventions sustainable and to provide the links between poor communities and service providers. NGOs may not be the right source of that leadership;</li> <li>• interventions are more likely to be sustainable if communities make a contribution (in cash or kind); but</li> <li>• The pursuit of sustainability is likely to exclude the poorest, although poor</li> </ul> | <p><i>Confirmed</i></p> <p><i>I think all key lessons are still valid, but PCR reviewed do not contain elements to support them</i></p> <p><i>Confirmed (HA)</i></p> <p><i>Confirmed</i></p> <p><i>Confirmed</i></p> <p><i>No similar statement</i></p> <p><i>Confirmed</i></p> <p><i>No similar statement</i></p>   | <p><i>Confirmed</i></p> |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>communities have found ways around their financial constraints e.g. to support health services in Bangladesh;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reaching the poorest and most vulnerable remains very difficult and requires special focus on them, their complex needs and the political context;</li> <li>• Poor people themselves must be the key actors in identifying and addressing their livelihoods priorities; and</li> <li>• Participatory techniques work. The PCRs contain various suggestions.</li> </ul> | <p><i>No similar statement</i></p> <p><i>Confirmed</i></p> <p><i>Confirmed</i></p> |
| <p>4.24. Communities can also play a beneficial role in managing humanitarian aid. In particular, the PCRs agree that community-based targeting is a sound approach. People need to be empowered to take part and it should be complemented by vulnerability analysis.</p>   | <p><i>Confirmed</i></p>  |
| <p>4.25. The sample includes a number of projects to promote the rights of the poor through <b>rights-based approaches</b> or to increase the <b>accountability of governments to citizens</b>.</p>  | <p><i>No similar selection</i></p>   |
| <p>4.26. Rights-based approaches when powerful groups. Suggestions about dealing with conflict in such situations – be inclusive rather than confrontational, take time to communicate with all the stakeholders, build the capacity of the “duty bearers” and create spaces for dialogue between groups</p>   | <p><i>No similar statement</i></p>   |
| <p>4.27. Bangladesh experience: non-formal education an effective means of empowerment. However, marginalised people need sustained support and it is a mistake to spread educational inputs too thinly.</p>   | <p><i>No similar statement</i></p>   |
| <p>4.28. Support the important role played by <b>local NGOs and Community Based Organisations</b> in delivering services and advocating for rights. Some experience suggests that capacity-building can enable local NGOs to work well but a</p>   | <p><i>No similar statement</i></p>   |

### Nigerian PCR

comments “In capacity building of CSOs there is a danger of solutions searching for problems - many organisations achieve despite capacity problems and it can be counterproductive to create a sense that an organisation needs a set of capacities to function”.

Further comments: local NGOs are a varied group and collaboration must be based on thorough analysis of their capacity. It is also important to understand their interests and incentives before developing partnerships. A Kenya PCR raises the question of collaboration with more political groups, “The development community should not ignore ethnicity and identity-based organisations but should work out how best to engage with them and with issues of ethnicity and religion.”

*No similar statement*

4.29. Some PCRs point out that successful interventions depend on effective collaboration between NGOs and governments e.g. for health service delivery in Pakistan or child protection in Romania. Benefits can flow both ways. But sometimes, interventions have to overcome mistrust between Government and NGOs, as in Bangladesh education and on the question of Roma Rights in Eastern Europe. Close working together in the context of a project is one approach to overcoming this.

*Confirmed*

4.30. Collaboration with **private sector** much less represented (diverse activities involving business and commerce).

Views on public-private sector relationships vary from liberal economy values to more interventionist positions. This reflects the diversity of projects ranging from power sector reform in India to promoting micro-irrigation technology in Tanzania. Some projects have tried to build partnerships between business and the voluntary sector. There have been good results in Sri Lanka and Russia although there are clear limits to the willingness of the private sector to engage in non-profit activities.

*No similar statement*



Bolivia. In the first case DFID did not have a good enough understanding of the political dynamics and, in Kenya, DFID was guilty of taking at face value assertions of Government commitment to what turned out to be a donor-driven reform agenda. For decentralisation in Bolivia, the approach of high level policy dialogue failed to grapple with the underlying issue of political clientelism. The Indian programme aid cases, as well as numerous project PCRs, also emphasised the importance of a good understanding of the “drivers for change”.

*No similar statement*

4.34. The essence of many interventions is to **manage change** as part of institutional or policy reform. The process takes place within a context which is inherently uncertain and can be made more risky by policy and institutional failures. Indeed reform creates its own turbulence. The PCRs suggest ways of dealing with this: - try to anticipate factors beyond your control, take a holistic approach to promoting change, make sure you have the resources needed in place first, build cohesive teams that cross institutional boundaries, be flexible and adaptable, think “outside the box”, build institutional capacity to manage change and don’t be afraid to take risks and make mistakes.

*Confirmed.*

4.35. Political change is a **risk** for many programmes. Experience from Bangladesh suggested that the policy framework provided by a SWAp can help when negotiating a way forward with a new Government, even when their priorities had not been anticipated in its original design.

*Need to manage fiduciary risk: confirmed  
Re trade-off: no similar statement*

4.36. Managing **fiduciary risk** is a concern for PCRs dealing with programme aid. Several are concerned that more needs to be done to reduce these risks. But a Ugandan PCR suggests that DFID should look more rigorously at the trade-off between development benefits and fiduciary risk when making judgements on budget support. In Vietnam, the PCR points out the Government’s relatively good track record and urges realism over the influence DFID can expect to have on this issue.

*Capacity building aspect confirmed with fewer details*

4.37. Most of the interventions covered in the PCRs incorporate some form of **capacity building** of counterpart organisations. There are plenty of comments about the difficulties faced in weak institutional and policy contexts. Several PCRs emphasise the well-known limitations of traditional models of skills transfer, particularly where the objective involves structural change. One lesson is the need for a larger framework to ensure that increased capacity is used. Other PCRs come up with ideas for overcoming the practical problems. The lack of continuity of staff can be mitigated by building core teams, seeking commitments to keep trainees in the jobs for which they have been trained, developing networks, and by targeting staff who are less likely to be moved or who have future potential. PCRs contain many comments on skill development methods which generally cover familiar ground. There are some strong lessons on being culturally sensitive, making use of local training capacity and making sure that new learning is put into practice.

4.38. PCRs have a lot to say on practical aspects of design and preparation, for example:

- Preparation must be given enough time. But authors are divided on what that means in an emergency. One Iraq case points out that proper planning is essential while another from the same country suggests that a quick response and diving in the deep end is right.
- An inception phase may be a good idea but there could be risks of creating dependency by concentrating unsustainable resources in one area. Moreover, initial work should avoid raising unrealistic expectations.
- Stakeholders must be involved in design.
- Design should be flexible and responsive; but.
- There may be a trade off between flexibility and sloppy thinking. Several PCRs call for more rigorous and realistic logframes.
- Design should be simple and appropriate.
- Be realistic about how long it will take – this is one of the most frequent

*Confirmed*

*No similar statement*

*Confirmed*

*Confirmed*

*Not confirmed*

*No similar statement*

*Confirmed*

comments. Particularly when interventions involve institutional change, capacity-building or empowerment of the poor, they take much longer than optimistic planners tend to think. Development often means being “in for the long-term”.

- Exit strategies must be explicit and when they involve lesson learning, dissemination and replication this must be planned for and resourced.

Experience in two cases suggests there are diminishing returns to technical assistance at the end of a project and that continuing donor support may simply allow the government to avoid taking responsibility.

*Confirmed*

*Re government responsibility: no similar statement*

#### **Cross-cutting issues**

*No similar statement*

4.39. Comments on **HIV/AIDS** are not as widespread as one might expect, given its prevalence. PCRs do stress the importance of tackling the issue as a mainstream concern (Malawi, Nigeria). One from Lesotho comments about the difficulty of getting private sector commitment because of the cost.

*Confirmed*

4.40. **Gender** is also less common in PCR comments than one might expect, particularly from regions other than South Asia. PCRs from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan found that gender issues must be specifically targeted if they are to be addressed successfully. There are some interesting comments from other projects – the need for practical steps to address the problems of women managers in Pakistan; and several examples of successful interventions in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

*Confirmed*

4.41. **Conflict** sharpens the need for project managers to create good relationships with other stakeholders and build their own credibility. Several PCRs stress the importance of partnership and inclusivity to prevent conflict. For example, a Rwanda PCR emphasizes the need for social protection for all vulnerable groups during the post-conflict phase, not just ex-combatants, and one from Nepal advocates labour-intensive infrastructure as a way of providing

employment. Sensitivity to the local situation and the ability to adapt and respond flexibly is even more important than normal. PCRs from Nepal and West Bank and Gaza endorse the importance of strategies that take account of unintended positive and negative impacts.

4.42. There are some examples from Sierra Leone of a more top-down, approach *No similar statement.*

in a situation of government collapse, which required an initial reliance on expatriate staff and made it difficult to achieve a well-articulated policy framework (e.g. for the Anti-Corruption Commission). The key findings point to a need for strong high-level political commitment, a long-term DFID commitment and a leadership succession strategy.

4.43. Good management practice is fundamental to a robust response in a *Confirmed*

conflict zone. For example, experience in Iraq is that projects in dangerous environments should adopt best practice in relation to staff security and risk management. A PCR dealing with a project in conflict-prone inner-city Jamaica advocates a diverse project team with the right skills to handle the tricky situation.

4.44. Post-conflict reconstruction brings strong pressure for urgent action which *No similar statement*

may not be consistent with normal management systems. PCR comments are divided on whether this leads to good or bad outcomes. A Serbian PCR warns against mixing emergency and development phases of aid because the skills required are so different. For Sierra Leone and Iraq (recruitment), short-cuts were a bad thing but for Iraq (procurement) and Serbia good practice delivered quickly was better than best practice delivered late.

#### **Management**

4.45. Most of the comments in PCRs are in line with guidance and established *Confirmed*

good practice. Amongst the more interesting suggestions are some for

**collaborative management.** These include delegating management responsibilities to partners, developing joint implementation plans, transparent reporting and various kinds of consultative mechanisms and steering committees.

4.46. Responsive, flexible and fast management processes are particularly important for humanitarian aid. Other lessons include the importance of a clear communications strategy, ensuring the security of team members is considered at the outset, and the benefits of using national staff to target affected populations and deliver assistance. *Confirmed*

4.47. Although some PCRs endorse the idea of administrative implants in partner organisations, others (e.g. Malawi, Mozambique) feel strongly that specially created **project management units** are a bad idea because they duplicate existing systems. This contradiction reflects the tension between trying to deliver project objectives and systemic reforms. *No similar statement*

4.48. There is a diversity of experience about contracting out management from DFID to consultants etc. A case from Iraq found that sometimes the best approach is to appoint project managers and let them get on with it. However, other experience is that contracting out does not always work well. It is important that relative roles are clear and that conflicts of interest are avoided. *No similar statement*

4.49. There are plenty of comments endorsing the importance of effective **monitoring and evaluation.** Some PCRs provide evidence that community involvement can be successful. One argues that performance measurement should be a shared activity with other stakeholders, which can provide stakeholders with an opportunity for reflection and reinforcing their group commitment. For humanitarian aid, PCRs highlight the importance of having responsive and immediate monitoring data to guide the emergency response. Involving local stakeholders in monitoring improves the quality and accuracy of *Confirmed*

the information.

### **Sectoral lessons**

Focus coming from the previous PCR format.

4.50. The PCRs provide diverse lessons that are specific to sectors. The following gives a flavour:

- Non-formal education should cover the full primary cycle to provide sustainable skills (Bangladesh) *No similar statement*
- Distance education is a cost-effective way of providing opportunities for the development of educators (South Africa). *No similar statement*
- Health interventions must address the demand side of health care (several cases). *No similar statement*
- Social marketing is best used with products that lend themselves to mass distribution rather than those that require counseling or provider information. A product priced within the reach of poor women can generate revenue to cover costs of marketing and distribution. (Nigeria, Bangladesh) *No similar statement*
- Reforming the intensely politicised power sector is complex and long-term. A sustained process of capacity building and institutional development that is flexible and responds to a changing political environment must be built in. (India – Orissa) *No similar statement*
- Short-term employment on roads projects can assist households to recover from disaster, displacement and extreme poverty. It can also contribute to the empowerment of marginal groups, particularly women. It is feasible and appropriate to include social clauses in contract documentation e.g. to facilitate the enforcement of labour standards. (Mozambique) *No similar statement*
- Developing an organisational culture of zero tolerance of loan delinquency is essential for financial viability. Poverty-focused micro-finance programmes for women can be financially viable in Pakistan and taken to scale quickly, if the programme is focused and the product range restricted. Poor people are willing and able to pay sustainable levels of interest on loans. Their main concern is the size and period of the loan, rather than the interest rate. (Pakistan)

- The Cochin urban poverty reduction project yielded a range of sector specific lessons e.g. the success of community health volunteers, that successful enterprise development combines access to credit with capacity-building, that small scale waste management activities cannot be scaled up to make a significant impact on the livelihoods of the poor. (India-Cochin)

*No similar statement*
- Urban poverty reduction. Without community contributions there is no sense of ownership of infrastructure projects by the community, little or no interest in design or implementation and subsequent problems in operation and maintenance. The groups were far more sustainable as long as 50 % of contributions came from the community. (Pakistan)

*No similar statement*
- Public service reform. In a resource-constrained environment, it is unlikely that government will be willing to fund an expensive reform programme through their own budget. A joint donor financing arrangement is more likely to be effective. Technical fixes are possible but need to be strategic and linked, not a series of discrete interventions. The issues of organisational culture, change and the sociopolitical context are rarely addressed but critical to the success of the programme. (Uganda)

*Confirmed*
- The prospect of improved public services and government's commitment to other socio-economic targets are crucial to generating the support and enthusiasm required to implement public service reforms. (Tanzania)

*No similar statement*
- Targeting the poorest groups in agricultural projects is extremely challenging as they have very little or no land for agriculture and the transaction costs to attend training sessions are extremely high for them. Working on wider livelihood options (poultry, livestock and processing) is more acceptable to poorer groups. Although farmer groups were encouraged to tackle wider issues (dowry, access to land, social justice) this did not bring meaningful results as expected. The project could have impacted on livelihoods more if food

*No similar statement*



























































## Department for International Development

DFID, the Department for International Development: leading the British Government's fight against world poverty.

One in six people in the world today, around 1 billion people, live in poverty on less than one dollar a day. In an increasingly interdependent world, many problems – like conflict, crime, pollution and diseases such as HIV and AIDS – are caused or made worse by poverty.

DFID supports long-term programmes to help tackle the underlying causes of poverty. DFID also responds to emergencies, both natural and man-made.

DFID's work forms part of a global promise to:

- halve the number of people living in extreme poverty and hunger
- ensure that all children receive primary education
- promote sexual equality and give women a stronger voice
- reduce child death rates
- improve the health of mothers
- combat HIV and AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- make sure the environment is protected
- build a global partnership for those working in development.

Together, these form the United Nations' eight 'Millennium Development Goals', with a 2015 deadline. Each of these goals has its own, measurable, targets.

DFID works in partnership with governments, civil society, the private sector and others. It also works with multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, United Nations agencies and the European Commission.

DFID works directly in over 150 countries worldwide, with a budget of some £5.3 billion in 2006/07. Its headquarters are in London and East Kilbride, near Glasgow.

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